Democratic Rulemaking

This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	de Figueiredo, John M.
Other Persons:	Stiglitz, Edward (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Demokratie \| Democracy \| Demokratisierung \| Democratization

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (36 p)
Series:	NBER Working Paper ; No. w21765
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2015 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011085