Deserving poor and the desirability of minimum wage rules

Tomer Blumkin ; Leif Danziger

In this paper we provide a novel justification for the use of minimum wage rules to supplement the optimal tax-and-transfer system. We demonstrate that if labor supply decisions are concentrated along the intensive margin and employment is efficiently rationed, a minimum wage rule can be socially beneficial by serving as a tagging device that targets benefits to the deserving poor, defined as low-skilled workers exhibiting a weak taste for leisure.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Blumḳin, Tomer ; Danziger, Leif
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	redistribution \| minimum wage \| efficient rationing \| Theorie \| Theory \| Mindestlohn \| Minimum wage \| Umverteilung \| Redistribution

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (23 S.)
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. 4721
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/96854 [Handle]
Classification:	D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; H50 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337632