Design of the 3G Spectrum Auctions in the UK and Germany: An Experimental Investigation
This paper analyses the auction designs chosen for awarding 3G licences in the UK and Germany and compares them with respect to revenues and bidders' surplus using a laboratory experiment. In our study with a given number of bidders, the German design leads to higher revenues. However, bidder surplus in the German design is lower and bidders face a severe exposure problem. Because this might discourage participation, it will probably lead to less competitive bidding in real applications. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Seifert, Stefan ; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin |
Published in: |
German Economic Review. - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS. - Vol. 6.2005, 2, p. 229-248
|
Publisher: |
Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, (2005)
-
Der EU-Emissionsrechtehandel auf dem Prüfstand
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, (2004)
-
Emissions Trading and the Optimal Timing of Production
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, (2004)
- More ...