Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders : twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium
Year of publication: |
January 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hammond, Peter J. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 63.2017, 1, p. 1-50
|
Subject: | Market design | Demand revelation | Strategyproofness | Hidden endowments | Warehousing | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | General equilibrium | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
-
A double-track adjustment process for discrete markets with substitutes and complements
Sun, Ning, (2009)
-
Competitive equilibrium in markets for votes
Casella, Alessandra, (2012)
-
Competitive equilibrium in markets for votes
Casella, Alessandra, (2010)
- More ...
-
Consequentialist foundations for expected utility
Hammond, Peter J., (1987)
-
Interpersonal comparisons of utility : why and how they are and should be made
Hammond, Peter J., (1990)
-
A revelation principle for (boundedly) Bayesian rationalizable strategies
Hammond, Peter J., (1990)
- More ...