DESIGNING ANTITRUST RULES FOR ASSESSING UNILATERAL PRACTICES: A NEO-CHICAGO APPROACH
Year of publication: |
2004-09
|
---|---|
Authors: | Evans, David S. ; Padilla, A. Jorge |
Institutions: | Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) |
Subject: | Antitrust rules | unilateral practices | tying | Chicago School | per se illegality | rule of reason approach |
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