Detecting Collusion through Exchange of Favors in Repeated Procurement Auctions

It is known that bid rigging in public-work auctions in Japan often takes the form of exchanging favors. In such a scheme, the winner is designated based on the amount of favor he has given to other members of the ring. By explicitly modeling gfavorh as an explanatory variable, this paper analyzes data from the public-works auctions for consulting works in Naha, Japan, to confirm that such a collusion scheme is in operation.

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Year of publication:	2007-05
Authors:	Ishii, Rieko
Institutions:	Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Subject:	Bid rigging \| repeated auction

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers in Economics and Business.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 07-15 25 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; H57 - Procurement ; L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774313