Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetic
This paper extends Malik's analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals are strategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegal behaviors. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals' avoidance efforts are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity of sanctions, it is always socially efficient to set the fine at the maximal possible level. However, several paradoxical consequences occur: there may exist overdeterrence at optimum; more repressive policies lead to fewer arrests of offenders while more crimes may be committed; at the same time, the society may be closer to the first best number of crimes. Copyright © 2008 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | LANGLAIS, ERIC |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 10.2008, 3, p. 371-382
|
Publisher: |
Association for Public Economic Theory - APET |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?
Langlais, Eric, (2008)
-
On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis
Langlais, Eric, (2009)
-
Amenities and Risk in Forest Management
Brunette, Marielle, (2009)
- More ...