Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms
We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Our findings indicate that the pay-to-performance relation is weak. Board size and ownership concentration are the only corporate governance characteristics that explain variations in executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a stronger pay-to-performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans. Copyright (c) 2009 The Authors. Accounting and Finance (c) 2009 AFAANZ.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Banghøj, Jesper ; Gabrielsen, Gorm ; Petersen, Christian ; Plenborg, Thomas |
Published in: |
Accounting and Finance. - Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand - AFAANZ, ISSN 0810-5391. - Vol. 50.2010, 3, p. 481-510
|
Publisher: |
Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand - AFAANZ |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms
Banghøj, Jesper, (2010)
-
Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms
Banghøj, Jesper, (2009)
-
Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms
Banghøj, Jesper, (2010)
- More ...