Determinants of the Choice of the Hostile Takeover Mechanism: An Empirical Analysis of Tender Offers and Proxy Contests
This paper investigates the influence of target firm performance, capital structure, and ownership profile on the decision to pursue a hostile tender offer or, alternatively, a proxy contest. Empirically, firms with poorer financial performance are more likely to experience a proxy contest as opposed to a tender offer. Firms that are more highly leveraged and that tend to be management-controlled are more likely to be targets of proxy contests than of tender offers.
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sridharan, Uma V. ; Reinganum, Marc R. |
Published in: |
Financial Management. - Financial Management Association - FMA. - Vol. 24.1995, 1
|
Publisher: |
Financial Management Association - FMA |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Sridharan, Uma V., (1995)
-
The Social Impact of Business Failure: Enron
Sridharan, Uma V., (2002)
-
The Case of MicroStrategy, Inc.: SAB 101, Revenue Recognition, and Stock Valuation
Sridharan, Uma V., (2003)
- More ...