Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Models
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Strausz, Roland |
Publisher: |
München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY) |
Subject: | principal-agent theory | mechanism design | deterministic mechanisms | randomization | bunching |
Series: | |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.5282/ubm/epub.13522 [DOI] 789401509 [GVK] hdl:10419/93873 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:26 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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