Development and inefficient regulation under the threat of revolution
Year of publication: |
November 2016
|
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Authors: | Dorsch, Michael ; Dunz, Karl ; Maarek, Paul |
Published in: |
Journal of comparative economics : the journal of the Association for Comparative Economic Studies. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0147-5967, ZDB-ID 715350-8. - Vol. 44.2016, 4, p. 1040-1054
|
Subject: | Institutional choice | Regulation | Economic development | Rent-seeking | Asymmetric information | Perfect Bayesian equilibrium | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Regulierung | Entwicklung |
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