Differentiable Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Private and Public Goods in Domains that are Not Necessarily Large or Quasi-Linear

In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no mechanism which is efficient, strategy-proof and where consumption of both goods is positive for all agents. For the case of two or more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Corchón, Luis C.
Other Persons:	Rueda, Jose (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency \| Agentenbasierte Modellierung \| Agent-based modeling \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 10, 2008 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2691088 [DOI]
Classification:	D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011958