Discounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signals
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Renault, Jerome |
Other Persons: | Scarsini, Marco (contributor) ; scarlatti, sergio (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Theorie | Theory | Signalling |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2008 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March, 10 2012 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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