Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
Year of publication: |
2005-02
|
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Authors: | Streb, Jorge ; Lema, Daniel ; Torrens, Gustavo |
Institutions: | Universidad del CEMA |
Subject: | political budget cycles | asymmetric information | discretion | separation of powers | checks and balances | veto players | rule of law |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo.. - ISSN 1668-4583. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 286 |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
Source: |
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Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
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