Disentangling Managerial Incentives from a Dynamic Perspective: The Role of Stock Grants
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Hili, Amal ; Laussel, Didier ; Long, Ngo Van |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | stock grants | executive compensation | incentive contracts | moral hazard | agency problems |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 6083 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 869383671 [GVK] hdl:10419/147337 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_6083 [RePEc] |
Classification: | M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions (hiring, firing, turnover, part-time, temporary workers, seniority issues) ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) |
Source: |
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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal, (2016)
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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal, (2016)
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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal, (2017)
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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal, (2016)
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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal, (2016)
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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal, (2017)
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