Disloyal managers and proxy voting
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wang, Xianjue |
Published in: |
Finance research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1544-6123, ZDB-ID 2181386-3. - Vol. 44.2022, p. 1-11
|
Subject: | Agency cost | Corporate opportunities waiver | Long-term institutional investor | Mutual fund | Proxy voting | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor | Investmentfonds | Investment Fund | Aktienstimmrecht | Shareholder voting rights | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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