Divided boards : partisanship through delegated monetary policy

Etienne Farvaque; Gae͏̈l Lagadec

While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as is the case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), the literature largely stands on the ...ction of a single central banker, be it (or not) a conservative one. The purpose here is to consider explicitly the plural dimension of monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such a decision structure for monetary policy rules.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Farvaque, Étienne ; Lagadec, Gae͏̈l
Publisher:	Bonn : ZEI
Subject:	Partisan Theory \| Policy Boards \| Monetary Union \| Zentralbank \| Central bank \| Geldpolitik \| Monetary policy \| Gruppenentscheidung \| Group decision-making \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Politische Partei \| Political party \| Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| Economic theory of democracy \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (15 S.)
Series:	ZEI papers / Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Bonn. - Bonn : Zentrum, ZDB-ID 2160910-X.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/39646 [Handle]
Classification:	E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking and the Supply of Money and Credit. General ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010514289