Dividend Policy and Reputation
We examine the role of reputation when firms use dividends to signal their profitability. We analyze a signaling model in which reputation plays no role in equilibrium. We then show that taking reputation into account as a link between sequential dividend decisions makes it possible to endogenize signaling costs and obtain a separating equilibrium. Lastly, we use the reversibility hypothesis and assume that in each period, managers can reverse their choices in terms of dividend distribution. We find that in most cases, the signaling equilibrium becomes unstable, causing any dividend signaling policy to become difficult to implement. Copyright (c) 2008 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2008-04
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Authors: | Gillet, Roland ; Lapointe, Marc-André ; Raimbourg, Philippe |
Published in: |
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0306-686X. - Vol. 35.2008-04, 3-4, p. 516-540
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
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