Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection
Year of publication: |
2010-05-28
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gagliarducci, Stefano ; Nannicini, Tommaso |
Institutions: | Centro di Studi Internazionali Sull'Economia e la Sviluppo (CEIS), Facoltà di Economia |
Subject: | political selection | efficiency wage | term limit | regression discontinuity |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 162 49 pages |
Classification: | M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets ; H70 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations. General |
Source: |
-
Do better paid politicians perform better? Disentangling incentives from selection
Gagliarducci, Stefano, (2009)
-
Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection
Gagliarducci, Stefano, (2009)
-
Do better paid politicians perform better? : disentangling incentives from selection
Gagliarducci, Stefano, (2009)
- More ...
-
Tenure in Office and Public Procurement
Coviello, Decio, (2010)
-
Outside Income and Moral Hazard: The Elusive Quest for Good Politicians
Gagliarducci, Stefano, (2008)
-
Gagliarducci, Stefano, (2010)
- More ...