Do better paid politicians perform better? : disentangling incentives from selection
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gagliarducci, Stefano ; Nannicini, Tommaso |
Published in: |
Journal of the European Economic Association. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, ISSN 1542-4766, ZDB-ID 2114709-7. - Vol. 11.2013, 2, p. 369-398
|
Subject: | Politiker | Politicians | Effizienzlohn | Efficiency wages | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Kommunalverwaltung | Local government | Gemeindefinanzen | Local government finance | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Fiscal consolidation | Italien | Italy | 1993-2007 |
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