Do CEO risk-reducing incentives affect operating leverage? : evidence from CEO inside debt holdings
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Bhabra, Gurmeet Singh ; Hossain, Ashrafee Tanvir |
Published in: |
Meditari accountancy research. - Bingley : Emerald, ISSN 2049-3738, ZDB-ID 2697245-1. - Vol. 32.2024, 3, p. 693-720
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Subject: | CEO inside debt | Executive compensation | Operating leverage | Risk | Agency conflicts | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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