Do Companies Engage in Auditor Shopping to Conceal Misreporting? Evidence from Financial Misstatements

We show that companies that misstate their financial statements successfully engage in auditor shopping to conceal the misreporting. In other words, their misstatements would have been discovered sooner had they made an opposite ‘replace or retain' auditor decision. The auditor shopping practice is more prevalent when the level of audit market competition is high. Additional analysis shows that engaging in auditor shopping bears detrimental labor market consequences to the CFO, as CFO turnover after a restatement is higher for companies involved in auditor shopping during the misstatement. Finally, strong financial expertise on the audit committee and greater board independence appear to curb auditor shopping. Overall, our study broadens the literature on opinion shopping by demonstrating that the motivation for an opportunistic auditor shopping extends beyond the desire to obtain a favorable audit opinion. Our findings should be of interest to regulators that continue to express concerns over this practice