Do countries free ride on MFN?
The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations. To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation. We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier rule. We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of export shares: higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff. Estimation of our model using sector-level tariff data for the U.S. provides strong support for this relationship.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Ludema, Rodney D. ; Mayda, Anna Maria |
Published in: |
Journal of International Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-1996. - Vol. 77.2009, 2, p. 137-150
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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