Do equity mispricing and management compensation incentives drive bank mergers?

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test whether bank mergers are driven by equity overvaluation and management compensation incentives. Design/methodology/approach – To test whether equity mispricing drive bank mergers, the authors employ two alternative price-to-residual income valuation ( P/V ) measures for bidders and targets while the authors control for their growth prospects with the price-to-book ( P/B ) (two years before) ratio. The intrinsic value ( V ) is estimated using the three-period forecast horizon residual income model of Ohlson (1995) and perpetual residual income model that does not rely on analysts’ forecasts of future earnings prospects. The latter measure allows the authors to estimate V for a much larger sample of banks. The empirical analysis is supplemented with a standard event analysis and assessment of the long-term performance of bank mergers subsequent to the announcement date. Findings – The evidence shows that bidders are overvalued relative to their targets, especially in equity offer deals. The authors also find that highly valued bidders: are more likely to use stock than cash; are willing to pay more relative to the target market price; are more likely to acquire private than public targets; earn lower announcement-period returns; fail to create synergy gains; experience long-term underperformance; and reward their top managers of with large compensation increases subsequent to mergers. Originality/value – This study provides results consistent with the view that behavioral and managerial incentives play an important role in motivating bank mergers.