Do Firms Contract Efficiently on Past Performance When Hiring External CEO's?
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Cazier, Richard A. ; McInnis, John M. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Personalbeschaffung | Recruitment | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Vertrag | Contract | Effizienz | Efficiency |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (42 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 30, 2010 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1732754 [DOI] |
Classification: | G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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