Do Health Care Report Cards Cause Providers to Select Patients and Raise Quality of Care?
Year of publication: |
2012-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chen, Yijuan ; Meinecke, Juergen |
Institutions: | Research School of Economics, College of Business and Economics |
Subject: | health care report cards | provider moral hazard | quality improvement | difference–in–differences estimation |
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