Do Hospitals Cross Subsidize?
Guy David, Richard Lindrooth, Lorens A. Helmchen, Lawton R. Burns
Cross-subsidies are often considered the principal mechanism through which hospitals provide unprofitable care. Yet, hospitals' reliance on and extent of cross-subsidization are difficult to establish. We exploit entry by cardiac specialty hospitals as an exogenous shock to incumbent hospitals' profitability and in turn to their ability to cross-subsidize unprofitable services. Using patient-level data from general short-term hospitals in Arizona and Colorado before and after entry, we find that the hospitals most exposed to entry reduced their provision of services considered to be unprofitable (psychiatric, substance- abuse, and trauma care) and expanded their admissions for neurosurgery, a highly profitable service
Year of publication: |
August 2011
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Authors: | David, Guy |
Other Persons: | Helmchen, Lorens A. (contributor) ; Burns, Lawton R. (contributor) ; Lindrooth, Richard (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Krankenhaus | Hospital | Subvention | Subsidy | Theorie | Theory | Krankenhauskosten | Hospital costs | Krankenhausfinanzierung | Hospital financing | Gastgewerbe | Hospitality industry |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w17300 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w17300 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461357