Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Clemens, Georg ; Rau, Holger A. |
Institutions: | Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |
Subject: | Cartels | Leniency Programs | Ringleader Discrimination | Experiment |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | DICE Discussion Papers. - ISSN 2190-9938. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 130 |
Classification: | C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; K21 - Antitrust Law ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
Source: |
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Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence
Clemens, Georg, (2014)
-
Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? : experimental evidence
Clemens, Georg, (2014)
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Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? : experimental evidence ; conference paper
Clemens, Georg, (2014)
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Simultaneous and sequential contributions to step-level public goods: One vs. two provision levels
Normann, Hans-Theo, (2014)
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Competition in the workplace: An experimental investigation
Benndorf, Volker, (2012)
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