Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sheremeta, Roman M. ; Shields, Timothy W. |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 94.2013, C, p. 268-277
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Experiment | Strategic communication | Beliefs | Lying | Deception | Other-regarding preferences |
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