Do managers with limited liability take more risky decisions? : an information acquisition model
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Malcomson, James M. |
Published in: |
Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Blackwell, ISSN 1058-6407, ZDB-ID 1123863-X. - Vol. 20.2011, 1, p. 83-120
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Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Haftung | Liability | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Entscheidung | Decision | Risikofreude | Risk seeking | Theorie | Theory |
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