Do Ownership Structure and Governance Mechanisms Have an Effect on Corporate Fraud in China's Listed Firms?
Our study examines whether ownership structure and boardroom characteristics have an effect on corporate financial fraud in China. The data come from the enforcement actions of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The results from univariate analyses, where we compare fraud and no-fraud firms, show that ownership and board characteristics are important in explaining fraud. However, using a bivariate probit model with partial observability we demonstrate that boardroom characteristics are important, while the type of owner is less relevant. In particular, the proportion of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the tenure of the chairman are associated with the incidence of fraud. Our findings have implications for the design of appropriate corporate governance systems for listed firms. Moreover, our results provide information that can inform policy debates within the CSRC
Year of publication: |
[2005]
|
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Authors: | Chen, Gong-meng |
Other Persons: | Firth, Michael (contributor) ; Gao, Ning Daniel (contributor) ; Rui, Oliver M. (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2005]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (40 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 2005 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.728945 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012736398
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