Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Bernecker, Andreas |
Institutions: | Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Mannheim |
Subject: | Accountability | Political Competition | Quality of Politicians | Rent-Seeking | Absences |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 13-09 |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets |
Source: |
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Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament
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