Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? : evidence from the German parliament
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Bernecker, Andreas |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 36.2014, p. 55-70
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Subject: | Accountability | Political competition | Quality of politicians | Shirking | Absences | Politiker | Politicians | Deutschland | Germany | Fehlzeit | Work absence | Theorie | Theory | Parlament | Parliament | Wettbewerb | Competition |
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