Do Remittances Lead to a Public Moral Hazard in Developing Countries? An Empirical Investigation
This article tests the hypothesis that in a context of ‘bad governance’, remittance inflows strongly reduce public spending on education and health in receiving countries; a phenomenon called the ‘public moral hazard problem’. Using a large sample of 86 developing countries over the period 1996--2007, and after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances, the results suggest a negative impact of remittances on public spending on education and health, when governance is bad in remittance-dependent economies.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Ebeke, Christian Hubert |
Published in: |
Journal of Development Studies. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 0022-0388. - Vol. 48.2011, 8, p. 1009-1025
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Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
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