Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Jackson, C. Kirabo ; Schneider, Henry S. |
Published in: |
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 3.2011, 3, p. 244-67
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Extent: | application/pdf application/zip |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Notes: | DOI: 10.1257/app.3.3.244 |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; L92 - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation: Autos, Buses, Trucks and Water Carriers ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital |
Source: |
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Batarce, Marco, (2011)
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