Do subordinated debt holders discipline bank risk-taking? Evidence from risk management decisions
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Belkhir, Mohamed |
Published in: |
Journal of Financial Stability. - Elsevier, ISSN 1572-3089. - Vol. 9.2013, 4, p. 705-719
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Subordinated debt | Market discipline | Banking | Risk management | Too-big-to-fail |
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