Do Targets Grab the Cash in Takeovers : The Role of Earnings Management

Extant research on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) provides evidence that acquirers under perform subsequent to the takeover completion. Such evidence is more unequivocal for acquirers that finance the acquisition by issuing equity relative to those that use cash. Current literature recognizes various reasons for this under performance, most of which suggest overvaluation of the acquirers and/or over payment for the targets at the time of acquisition announcement. Alternatively, this paper aims to investigate whether acquirers' post takeover abnormal return is also attributed to target firms' real and/or accrual earnings management. Our results indicate that, on average, targets manage earnings upwards using real transactions rather than accruals, during the year preceding the takeover. More specifically, we find evidence of earnings management through sales among targets of cash acquisitions and that it is significantly and negatively related to the post-acquisition performance of the acquirers. These findings suggest that there is an association between the method of financing in acquisitions and earnings management in target firms, which could impact the post-takeover performance of acquirers