Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tsoulouhas, Theofanis C. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 40.1999, 3, p. 275-294
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory |
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