Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? : an experimental deception game
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Angelova, Vera ; Regner, Tobias |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 93.2013, p. 205-218
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Subject: | Financial advisors | Asymmetric information | Principal-agent | Sender-receiver game | Deception | Reciprocity | Experiments | Voluntary payment | Experiment | Asymmetrische Information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Anlageberatung | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Honorar | Fee (Remuneration) | Kapitalanlage | Financial investment | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory |
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