Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual-Class Firms
"We examine whether, and to what extent, shareholder voting rights affect institutional investment decisions. We find that institutional ownership in dual-class firms is significantly lower than it is in single-class firms after controlling for other determinants of institutional investment. Although institutions of all types hold fewer shares of dual-class firms, this avoidance is more pronounced for long-term investors with strong fiduciary responsibilities than for short-term investors with weak fiduciary duties. Following the unification of dual-class shares into a single class, institutional investors increase their shareholdings in the unifying firm. Overall, our results suggest that voting rights are an important determinant of institutional investment decisions." Copyright (c) 2008 Financial Management Association International..
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Li, Kai ; Ortiz-Molina, HernĂ¡n ; Zhao, Xinlei |
Published in: |
Financial Management. - Financial Management Association - FMA. - Vol. 37.2008, 4, p. 713-745
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Publisher: |
Financial Management Association - FMA |
Saved in:
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