Do Workers Work More When Wages are High?
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Fehr, Ernst ; Goette, Lorenz |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Lohn | Wages | Arbeitsangebot | Labour supply | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Schweiz | Switzerland | Intertemporale Entscheidung | Intertemporal choice | Experiment |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (48 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 2004 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.500908 [DOI] |
Classification: | J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply ; C93 - Field Experiments ; B49 - Economic Methodology. Other |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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