Does Central Bank Independence Smooth the Political Business Cycle in Inflation? Some OECD Evidence.
In this paper, electoral and partisan effects in inflation are identified for eighteen OECD countries via regression analysis, building on the work of A. Alesina, G. Cohen, and N. Roubini. The correlation of the size of these effects across countries with the level of central bank independence is investigated; the results suggest a negative correlation. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Hadri, Kaddour ; Lockwood, Ben ; Maloney, John |
Published in: |
The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies. - School of Economics. - Vol. 66.1998, 4, p. 377-95
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Publisher: |
School of Economics |
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