Does CEO inside debt compensation benefit both shareholders and debtholders?
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Borah, Nilakshi ; James, Hui Liang ; Park, Jung Chul |
Published in: |
Review of quantitative finance and accounting. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 1573-7179, ZDB-ID 2009625-2. - Vol. 54.2020, 1, p. 159-203
|
Subject: | Inside debt | Dividend policy | Firm valuation | Agency theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Dividende | Dividend | Führungskräfte | Managers | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Unternehmensbewertung | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance |
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