Does common ownership really increase firm coordination?
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lewellen, Katharina ; Lowry, Michelle |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 141.2021, 1, p. 322-344
|
Subject: | Common ownership | Corporate governance | Institutional ownership | Corporate Governance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor |
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