Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?
Year of publication: |
2008-01
|
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Authors: | Martinez-Miera, David ; Repullo, Rafael |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | Bank competition | Bank failure | Credit risk | Default correlation | Franchise values | Loan defaults | Loan rates | Moral hazard | Net interest income | Risk-shifting |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 6669 |
Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; E43 - Determination of Interest Rates; Term Structure Interest Rates ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages |
Source: |
-
DOES COMPETITION REDUCE THE RISK OF BANK FAILURE?
Repullo, Rafael, (2008)
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Endogeneous Risk in Monopolistic Competition
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Endogeneous Risk in Monopolistic Competition
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Does competition reduce the risk of bank failure?
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