Does deposit insurance promote moral hazards and adverse selection? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the likelihood that the presence of the deposit insurance policy encourages risk appetite behavior of banks in Sub-Saharan African (SSA). It argues that financial system stability is not a function of the choice of a deposit insurance scheme, but countries' peculiarities such as quality of institutions and the macroeconomic environment. Design/methodology/approach: The study used the stereotype logit regression model and covers 47 SSA countries. Countries are categorized into two: explicit and implicit DIP scheme. Findings: The study found that corrupt countries are more likely to adopt the implicit policy, while the explicit policy exposes them to credit risk, insolvency, and negative macroeconomic shocks, a reflection of weak institutions and unhealthy competition. Research limitations/implications: Paucity of substantial local literature on institutional perspective of deposit insurance (DI) constitutes the major limitation of this study. Practical implications: The sub-region, therefore, faces a conundrum - desiring a deposit insurance scheme, but lacking the required institutions to maintain either a publicly owned regulatory system or the ability to transplant the private club model. Originality/value: This study contributes to the institutional perspective of DI from SSA institutional perspective.