Does Distribution Matter? Efficiency, Equity and Flexibility in Greenhouse Gas Abatement

This paper analyses banking and borrowing ofcarbon emission rights within the framework ofa simple, integrated assessment model. Breaking the world economy in just two regionsit will be shown: (1) Increasing intertemporal flexibility in greenhouse gasabatement through banking and borrowing ofcarbon emission permits has a positive effecton welfare for regions with a poor endowment incarbon emission rights, but negatively affectsrich-endowed regions. (2) Intergenerationalfairness advocates intertemporal flexibility ingreenhouse gas abatement, irrespectively of theinitial allocation of carbon rights. (3)Optimal carbon accumulation is not independentof the initial allocation of carbon rights. Different initial sharing rules clearlyinfluence the development of atmospheric carbonconcentration. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004