Does Divorce Law Matter?

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Mariotti, Marco ; Manzini, Paola ; Fella, Giulio
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Eherecht \| Familienökonomik \| Privater Transfer \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Theorie \| Scheidung \| Bargaining \| divorce \| non transferability

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Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 439
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	845016660 [GVK] hdl:10419/21517 [Handle]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262808