Does executive compensation restrict firm over-investment?
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | ElSeoud, Mohamed Sayed Abou ; Ebrahim, Rabab ; Mili, Mehdi ; Yassin, Mohamed |
Published in: |
Journal of Islamic financial studies. - Sakhir : Scientific Publishing Center, ISSN 2469-259X, ZDB-ID 2908229-8. - Vol. 6.2020, 2, p. 89-100
|
Subject: | Executive Compensation | Corporate Governance | Over-investment | Shareholders | Finance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Shareholder Value | Shareholder value | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
-
Sarhan, Ahmed A., (2023)
-
Managerial shareholding policies and retention of vested equity incentives
Korczak, Piotr, (2014)
-
Incentive Alignment through Performance-Focused Shareholder Proposals on Management Compensation
Fortin, Steve, (2014)
- More ...
-
ElSeoud, Mohamed Sayed Abou, (2020)
-
ElSeoud, Mohamed Sayed Abou, (2020)
-
Stock liquidity and capital structure : evidence from Saudi listed firms
Abdulla, Yomna, (2020)
- More ...