Does financial advisor quality improve liquidity and issuer benefits in segmented markets? Evidence from the municipal bond market

Purpose: Using a unique sample of about 563,000 competitively bid municipal revenue bonds with financial advisors issued during the period 1998–2012, the purpose of this paper is to examine the role and influence of financial advisor quality in the municipal bond market. Design/methodology/approach: The authors use a sample of about 563,000 competitively bid municipal revenue bonds with financial advisors issued during the period 1998–2012. The authors estimate a selection model where the authors identify the factors leading to the selection of a high-quality financial advisor. The authors then, using the inverse mills ratio from the first regression, estimate the association of high-quality advisor (and other factors) with the cost of borrowing. Findings: The results suggest that high-quality financial advisors provide a credible signal to market participants about issue and issuer quality. This signal translates to a greater number of bids for issues that use high-quality financial advisors, resulting in improved liquidity and lower borrowing costs for these issues. The results also show that the beneficial effects obtained by using higher quality financial advisors are prevalent across all categories of issues such as for refunding and non-refunding issues, and for both insured and non-insured issues. The benefits are also generally observed for issues of most size categories. The results also suggest that the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act requiring mandatory registration of financial advisors and enhanced scrutiny has only increased the benefits to issuers from using higher quality financial advisors. Originality/value: This paper differs from previous research in several important ways. First, the study is, to the authors’ knowledge, the first study that explores the relationship between financial advisor quality and liquidity in the municipal sector. The authors show using higher quality financial advisors enhances liquidity for the issues by attracting a significantly large number of bids. Second, the sample is exclusively comprised of competitively bid revenue issues all of which rely on financial advisors. This enables us to examine more unambiguously the influence of financial advisor quality, without the confounding effects of issues without financial advisors. Third, time coverage (1998–2012) and size of the sample (roughly 563,000 bond issues) enables us to conduct varied sub-sample analyses with greater power since the resulting sub-sample partitions themselves are of very large size. This provides better and additional insights into the role of financial advisor quality. The more current data when compared to prior research enables us to examine the impact of financial advisor quality inter-temporally with special attention devoted to the period after passage of the Dodd–Frank Act.